What social engineering is

Social engineering is deception aimed at getting a person to do something they would not do if they knew who was really on the other side: hand over a password, approve a payment, open a file or install software. The weakness it exploits lies in people, not in computers. Trust in a familiar name, the wish to help and time pressure do most of the work.

Phishing is its most common form: a message that impersonates a familiar party, such as a bank, a shipping company, a supplier or a manager in the organization. These messages have improved a great deal. Their Hebrew is correct, the design is identical to the original, and in many cases they refer to real details about the organization collected from its website and from social networks. AI tools make it easier to write such messages, so the old sign of spelling mistakes no longer helps.

The familiar forms

  • Impersonating email: a message with a link to a fake sign-in page or with an attachment, usually on a subject that justifies quick action: an unpaid invoice, a document to sign, a full mailbox.
  • Spear phishing: a message written for a specific person, with correct names, projects and dates.
  • Text and WhatsApp messages (smishing): a message about a package waiting, a fine or a blocked account, with a link.
  • Phone call (vishing): someone who presents themselves as a support representative, a bank or a software vendor, and asks for a code, details or the installation of remote control software.
  • Impersonating a manager or a supplier (BEC): an urgent request to transfer money or change bank account details, sometimes from a real account that was breached.
  • QR code (quishing): a code in a message or on a sign that leads to a fake sign-in page, so the address itself is not visible at all.

What increases the risk

Whether an impersonating message succeeds depends less on how sophisticated it is and more on the environment it arrives in. These are the things that increase the chance it will work:

  • Processes in which one person can approve a payment or change a supplier’s details without an additional check.
  • A culture of urgency, in which delaying a request “from the CEO” is seen as a bigger problem than a mistake.
  • A lot of public information about the organization: employee names and roles, suppliers and customers, which makes it possible to build a convincing message.
  • Accounts without multi-factor authentication (MFA), so a single password that was handed over is enough to sign in.
  • No advanced mail filtering and no domain authentication settings (SPF, DKIM, DMARC), which make it harder to impersonate the organization’s address.
  • Employees who do not know whom to report to, or who are afraid to admit they clicked a link.

Signs worth stopping for

A good impersonating message does not look suspicious. That is why the important signs have to do with what the message asks for, more than with how it looks:

  • A request to change bank account details, approve an unusual payment or buy gift cards.
  • Time pressure: “by the end of the day,” “the account will be blocked,” “I’m in a meeting, just transfer it.”
  • A request to keep the matter secret or not to involve others.
  • A sender address that looks familiar but differs by one letter, or a familiar name with an external address.
  • A link that leads to a sign-in page, especially when the message was not expected.
  • A request to hand over a code that arrived by text message, or to approve a sign-in request on the phone.
  • A call from “technical support” that nobody ordered.

The simple rule: when a message asks for money, a password or an installation, verify it through another channel. Call a number you already know, not the number that appears in the message.

The impact on the organization

Phishing is usually only the beginning. A password that was handed over leads to an account takeover, a file that was opened installs malware, and a “support” call gives a stranger remote control of the computer. From there the incident can roll into ransomware, a data leak or a money transfer that is very hard to recover.

There is also a liability side. When customer information is exposed because of an impersonating message, the question arises whether the organization took reasonable security measures: training, mail filtering, multi-factor authentication and procedures for approving payments. Responsibility does not stop with the employee who clicked the link. It applies to the organization, which did or did not put the defenses around that employee in place, and Amendment 13 to the Privacy Protection Law expanded the enforcement powers of the Privacy Protection Authority on exactly these questions.

How to reduce the risk

  • Mail filtering (email security): checking links and files, marking messages that come from outside, and stopping impersonation of the organization’s addresses.
  • Domain authentication (SPF, DKIM, DMARC): settings that make it harder to send emails impersonating the organization’s address, and that also protect its customers.
  • Multi-factor authentication (MFA), and for sensitive accounts, a method that resists fake sign-in pages.
  • Dual approval for financial actions (four eyes): changing a supplier’s details or an unusual payment requires two people and phone verification.
  • Short, regular training (security awareness), and controlled exercises with impersonating messages (phishing simulation), where the goal is to learn and not to catch employees.
  • A report button in the email software, and one clear address for reporting a suspicious call or text message.
  • Endpoint and server protection (EDR): when a message gets through anyway and the file is opened, this is the layer that may stop what comes next.

After a click: what to do

What you do in the first minutes depends on what actually happened:

  • A password was entered on a suspicious page: change the password immediately, from a clean computer, end active sessions and check whether mail rules or unknown authentication methods were added.
  • A file was opened or software was installed: disconnect the computer from the network without turning it off, and report immediately.
  • A payment was approved: contact the bank immediately and inform whoever is responsible for finances.
  • Details were given over the phone: write down what was said and to whom, and change every password or code that was handed over.

At the same time, whoever manages email searches for the same message in the other employees’ mailboxes, removes it and blocks the sender and the link. A phishing message often reaches several people in the same organization, and one employee’s report can protect all the others.

When to involve the incident response (IR) team

Not every click is a cyber incident, but that decision should be made by someone who knows how to check. Contact an incident response team when there is a sign that the attacker succeeded: a sign-in to an account from an unknown location, a file that was run, remote control software that was installed, or money that was transferred.

The team assesses the scope (triage), contains what was affected (containment), investigates how the message got through and what was done after it, and returns the systems to work in a controlled way. It also helps determine whether personal information was exposed, and whether a report to the Privacy Protection Authority or a call to the National Cyber Directorate’s 119 hotline should be considered. After the incident, the lessons go back into training and procedures, so that next time a similar message meets better defenses.

Summary

  • Social engineering targets people, and phishing is its most common form: by email, text message, phone and QR code.
  • The important sign is the request itself: money, a password, a code or an installation, especially under time pressure.
  • Mail filtering, domain authentication, MFA and dual approval for payments greatly reduce the risk.
  • An employee who clicked should report immediately, and when there is a sign the attacker succeeded, bring in the IR team.