Why a password alone is not enough
Most break-ins into business accounts do not require sophistication. A password is stolen on a fake sign-in page (phishing), leaks from another website where the employee used the same password (credential stuffing), or is guessed because it is simple. From the moment the attacker holds the password to the mailbox, they can read correspondence with customers, send requests in the business’s name to change bank account details (BEC) and reset the passwords of other systems.
Multi-factor authentication (MFA) adds a step the attacker does not hold: an approval on the phone, a code from an app or a physical key. Even when the password has leaked, the sign-in is blocked. This is one of the simplest and most effective steps a business can take, and it appears in the National Cyber Directorate’s basic recommendations for businesses.
There is also a regulatory side. A breached email account usually exposes customers’ personal information, and since Amendment 13 to the Privacy Protection Law came into force in August 2025, the Privacy Protection Authority has broader enforcement powers. Multi-factor authentication is a basic security measure whose absence is hard to explain.
Which authentication methods exist
Not all authentication methods are equal. From weakest to strongest:
- SMS code: better than nothing, but exposed to impersonation toward the mobile carrier and to moving the number to another SIM card (SIM swapping). Suitable mainly when there is no alternative.
- Authenticator app: a rotating code or a tap to approve, for example in Microsoft Authenticator or Google Authenticator. This is the most common method in businesses. In the version where you type into the app a number shown on the sign-in screen (number matching), it is harder to exploit.
- Security keys and passkeys: FIDO2-standard authentication that is bound to the real website’s address, so it does not work on a fake page. This is the method most resistant to phishing (phishing-resistant), and it is especially recommended for administrator accounts.
In practice, most businesses combine them: an authenticator app for all employees, and physical keys or passkeys for administrator accounts and for whoever handles finances. SMS remains a backup only, or for services that do not support another method.
Which accounts to protect first
If you cannot do everything at once, start with the accounts whose breach opens all the others:
- Administrator accounts: Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace admins, Active Directory, the firewall, the backup system and the hosting provider.
- Every employee’s email: email is where passwords to every other system are reset.
- Remote access: VPN, remote desktop and any sign-in to the business systems from outside.
- Money: banks, payment processing, accounting and payroll systems.
- The domain and online presence: the domain registrar, DNS management, website hosting, and the business’s advertising and social media accounts.
Domain and DNS accounts are often forgotten, but whoever takes them over can point the business’s email and website anywhere they want.
The same requirement applies to external suppliers who connect to the business systems: the IT provider, the software company and vendors’ remote support. A supplier account without multi-factor authentication is a back door, and sometimes it holds the broadest permissions on the network.
Rolling it out without stopping work
A rollout done one morning without preparation creates a flood of support requests and frustration, and employees who look for ways around it. An order of work that works better:
- Start with a small group (pilot), including management, to find problems before everyone runs into them.
- Send a short message: what is changing, why, and what the employee needs to do.
- Set a time window for enrollment, with help available for anyone who gets stuck.
- Once everyone is enrolled, make authentication mandatory and remove the option to skip it.
In systems such as Microsoft 365, you can set up a conditional access policy, so the additional authentication is required according to context: on a new device, from an unknown location or for a sensitive action, and less for routine work from a managed computer in the office. This balances security and convenience, and reduces employee resistance.
Exceptions and special accounts
Every business has accounts that do not fit the pattern: a printer that sends scans by email, old software that signs in with a username and password, a shared mailbox, or a workstation used by several employees in shifts. Exceptions like these are exactly where attackers look.
The rule is to minimize and document. Service accounts get minimal permissions (least privilege) and are restricted to use from a specific address or device. Shared mailboxes are opened through each employee’s personal account and not with a shared password. Old protocols that do not support multi-factor authentication (legacy authentication) are blocked, and every exception that remains is recorded with a reason and a date for review. In such a review it often turns out that some of the exceptions are no longer needed.
When attackers try to bypass authentication
Multi-factor authentication makes things very hard for attackers, and they adapt. Two common methods are worth knowing. The first is flooding with approval requests (MFA fatigue): the attacker, who already holds the password, sends request after request to the employee’s phone until the employee approves just to make it stop. The second is an intermediary sign-in page (adversary-in-the-middle), which passes the password and the code to the real website in real time and steals the session that is created (session hijacking).
The answer is a combination of several things. An approval that requires typing a number from the screen prevents approving by mistake. A clear instruction to employees, that an approval request they did not start is a sign of a breach and must be reported immediately, turns them into a sensor. FIDO2 keys for the sensitive accounts block the intermediary page, and monitoring of unusual sign-ins makes it possible to spot whatever gets through anyway.
The password still matters
Multi-factor authentication does not make the password irrelevant. Current professional recommendations, such as the NIST guidelines for digital identity management, prefer long passwords (passphrases) over complexity rules, and checking against lists of leaked passwords over forced changes every few months. A change is required when there is a reason, for example a suspected leak.
The practical tool is a business password manager. It lets every employee use a different password for each service without remembering them, and lets the business share passwords for shared accounts in a controlled way and revoke access when an employee leaves.
When the phone is lost
The phone has become a key, so you need to plan what happens when it is lost, stolen or replaced. Every employee should have two registered authentication methods, and there should be a clear reset procedure: who approves, how you verify that the person asking is really the employee, and what is documented.
For the main administrator accounts, it is worth keeping an emergency account (break-glass account), with a long password and a physical key stored in a secure place, in case all the other methods are unavailable.
Where to start
A practical order of work, from the most important:
- Turn on multi-factor authentication for all administrator accounts.
- Extend it to every employee’s email and to remote access.
- Add the bank, domain and website accounts.
- Block old protocols and document exceptions.
- Set a reset procedure with identity verification.
- Consider FIDO2 keys for the most sensitive accounts.
This is a relatively short project with a large impact. It requires planning and familiarity with the systems, so it is best led by an IT provider who understands both the technical side and information security.