What Active Directory holds
In most offices that run on Windows, Active Directory (AD) is the system that manages identities (identity management): who the employees are, which groups they belong to, which folders and servers they are allowed to access, and which computers belong to the organization. Through Group Policy it also sets configuration on every computer: passwords, updates, software and permissions.
When an employee signs in in the morning to the computer, the file server, the printer and sometimes the VPN and other systems, in most cases it is AD that approves the connection. In organizations that also work with Microsoft 365, these identities are synchronized to the cloud (Microsoft Entra ID), so the same account also opens email and documents in the cloud.
Why it is an attacker’s first target
Whoever controls AD controls the organization. An account with Domain Admin rights can access every server and every file, create new users and change settings on all computers at once. So an attacker who gets into the network through an employee’s computer almost always tries first to understand the AD structure and find a way to higher privileges (privilege escalation).
This is also why large ransomware incidents look the way they do. The attacker does not settle for one computer. They use the privileges they obtained to reach every server and computer, and sometimes the backups that are joined to the same domain. The difference between a local incident and a shutdown of the whole business usually comes down to how easy it was to get from the first computer to control of AD.
How AD weakens over the years
Active Directory is usually set up once and then keeps growing for years. Employees join and leave, suppliers get accounts for a project, new systems need a service account with broad permissions “so it works”, and system administrators change. Each of these changes makes sense at the moment it is made. Together they create a system that nobody fully knows anymore.
The result is familiar: accounts of employees who left and were never closed (offboarding), admin groups with more members than needed, service accounts whose password has not changed since installation, and old settings that stayed because nobody is sure what will happen if they are changed. None of them causes a problem day to day, so they are not discovered until someone checks.
What an AD security assessment checks
An Active Directory security assessment is usually part of an internal penetration test (internal PT), and it is done like any test: with written authorization, a defined scope and agreed rules of engagement. Part of it is a configuration review from an account the organization provides, and part is a test from the point of view of a regular user: what they can see and where they can get to. Among the areas checked:
- Privileged accounts: who belongs to the admin groups, whether admin accounts are separate from everyday work accounts, and whether admins sign in with high privileges to regular computers.
- Service accounts: what permissions they have, when the password was last changed, and whether they can be replaced with managed service accounts.
- Password and authentication policy: length and complexity, lockout after failed attempts, and the use of old authentication protocols (legacy authentication) such as NTLM.
- The local administrator password: whether it is the same on every computer, or each computer has its own unique local admin password (LAPS).
- Delegation and object permissions (ACL): permissions granted in the past to users or groups that allow them to change other accounts.
- Group Policy: settings that expose sensitive information, or that unauthorized users can change.
- The certificate service (AD CS): loosely configured certificate templates that let a user obtain privileges they were never meant to have.
- Inactive accounts: users and computers that have not signed in for a long time and are still enabled.
Attack paths: how small weaknesses connect
The most important finding in an AD assessment is usually not a single weakness but an attack path: a chain of permissions and settings, each of which looks reasonable, that together lead from a regular user to Domain Admin rights. For example, a group of support staff that was once given permission to reset passwords, including for an account that belongs to an admin group. Each permission makes sense on its own, and the combination opens a way in.
Dedicated tools that analyze the relationships in AD (attack path analysis) show these paths as a graph, and that is what makes the report useful. Instead of a long list of settings, the organization gets a few main paths, and for each one the point where it is simplest to cut it.
What to fix first
Fixing AD is done carefully, because almost every change affects users and systems. A common order:
- Cleanup: closing the accounts of employees who left and inactive accounts, and trimming the admin groups down to those who really need them (least privilege).
- Separating admin accounts: a separate account for administrative work that is not used for email and browsing, and a tiering model that prevents Domain Admin accounts from signing in to regular computers.
- Privileged account management (PAM): controlled storage of passwords for sensitive accounts, a unique, rotating password for every computer (LAPS), and replacing old passwords on service accounts.
- Two-factor authentication (MFA) for admin accounts and remote access, and a gradual phase-out of old authentication protocols.
- Security monitoring and alerting (SIEM / SOC): alerts on changes to admin groups, on account creation and on unusual sign-in attempts.
Each of these changes goes through change management and is tested first on a small group. Turning off an old protocol, for example, can stop a printer, a scanner or a specialized system, so you start by tracking who still uses it, and only then block it.
Hybrid AD and the cloud
In organizations that work with Microsoft 365, the on-premises AD does not stand alone. Identities are synchronized to Microsoft Entra ID, and from there access opens to email, documents and other cloud systems. This means a weakness in the on-premises AD can affect the cloud too, and depending on the sync settings, a compromised cloud account can also affect the local environment.
So a thorough AD assessment also covers the sync component, the permissions of cloud admin accounts and the conditional access policy. It checks that cloud admin accounts are not the same accounts synchronized from the on-premises AD, and that strong authentication is configured on them.
Why this belongs to whoever manages the infrastructure
An AD security assessment produces a list of changes that touch every user and every server. A team that does not know the network can write correct recommendations, but it does not always know which specialized system will break because of a change, which service account keeps the accounting system running, or when a change can be made without stopping work.
This is where an IT company that manages the infrastructure and understands information security in depth has the advantage. It tests by a recognized methodology, understands the context of every finding, fixes gradually and with documentation, and runs a retest to confirm the paths are actually closed. It also knows what the Privacy Protection Regulations (Data Security), 2017 and the National Cyber Directorate guidance require for permission management and access control, and can document the process so that it holds up with the Privacy Protection Authority, an external auditor or an insurance company. Since Amendment 13 to the Privacy Protection Law came into force, the question of who could have accessed personal data in the organization carries real weight in enforcement.
Summary
- Active Directory holds the keys to the whole network, which is why it is the first target of an attacker who gets in.
- Over the years it builds up accounts, permissions and settings that nobody fully knows.
- An AD security assessment, as part of an internal test, uncovers attack paths, which matter more than any single setting.
- Start with cleaning up accounts and separating admin accounts, move on to PAM, LAPS and MFA, and add monitoring.
- Every fix is made gradually and documented, and at the end a retest is run.